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Initiated in 2003, China’s recent round of collective forest tenure reform (CFTR) aims to
improve tenure security and motivate households to engage in forestry production. For the
forested land allocated to households after the reforms, forest management and protection
have become key in forestry production. However, few studies have analyzed the effect of
different dimensions of forestland tenure security on rural household forest management
and protection. Based on survey data from 766 households in southern China, the present
study examines this effect using the Negative Binomial and Tobit models. The empirical
results indicate that the actual tenure security derived from the possession of forestland
certificates has insignificantly increased forest management frequency and management
intensity. With regard to perceived tenure security, we found that if forestland is perceived
to be adjusted in the future, this can have a significant positive impact on both manage-
ment frequency and management intensity. In contrast, a perception that certificates may
protect forestland rights would have insignificant effect on management frequency and
management intensity of forestland. Specifically, for households with certificates for all
forestland, perception about future adjustments on tenure security would positively affect
management frequency and intensity. For households with certificates for part of forest-
land, the perception about certificates has a positive impact on management frequency.
© 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Forestland tenure security is considered an important factor to promote sustainable forest management (Besley, 1995; Li
et al., 1998; Zhang et al., 2000;Wang et al., 2015). Over the past 70 years, China’s forest policy has undergone several changes,
which have decreased households’ confidence in the security of forestland tenure, and affected the productivity and growing
stock of collective forestland (Miao and West, 2004). According to the Ninth China Forestry Survey, the per capita forest area
and the per capita forest stock volume in China represent less than one-third and one-sixth, respectively, of theworld average
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collective forest tenure reform (CFTR) in 2003 (Xu et al., 2010). The CFTR contains two phases, namely, the main reform and the
supportive reform. The task of the main reformwas to clarify forest property rights, demarcate forestland boundaries, and issue
legal certificates to families to ensure that individual households had rights tomanage and use their own forestland; such rights
were to help improve the forestland tenure security of households (Siikam€aki et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2016). By 2018,180.33million
hm2 of collective forestland in China have been allocated to households, representing around 99% of the area included in CFTR
(SFGA, 2018). Themain reform has been essentially completed. The supportive reform involved reducing forestry taxes and fees,
promotingmoderate forestland transfers, and allowing forestland usufruct rights as collateral, among others (Xie et al., 2016). It
entitled individual households to more rights, which enabled them to transfer, inherit and mortgage their forestland (Liu et al.,
2017a). It thereby further enhanced households’ perception of forestland tenure security. By 2018, the area of forestland under
large-scalemanagement have reached 4 billion hm2, and the balance of forest propertymortgage loans have reached 127 billion
yuan (SFGA, 2018).
The CFTR has made households the main management body of collective forests. The long growth period of forest trees
requires that forestry production not only include afforestation inputs in the initial stage, but also uninterruptedmanagement
and protection for undeveloped forestland. It is important to distinguish various types of forest management activities (Xie
et al., 2013). Since most of the forestland allocated to farmers in CFTR is forested land, themanagement and protection of such
land by households has become a key link in forestry production, as well as an important way to improve the productivity
level and stock volume of collective forests. However, after contracting forestland to households, the current forestry man-
agement method is still extensive and low-efficiency (Liu et al., 2017b). Although households pay little attention to forestry
management and protection, they pay more attention to afforestation. Additionally, affected by factors such as resource
endowment, the initial status of property rights, and village-level autonomy, the CFTR differs in its implementation across
regions; thus forming a differentiated forestland tenure security situation, which makes the forestland tenure security of
households inconsistent with policy expectations (Chen and Innes, 2013). This significantly affects the enthusiasm of
households in the management of their forestland (Macours et al., 2010). Therefore, it is necessary to identify whether the
CFTR has given farmers secure tenure, and then encourage farmers to continue to manage and protect forestland.
With the advancement of the CFTR, China’s forestland tenure security and its relationship with farmers’ forestry man-
agement behavior have received much attention in relevant literature. Some studies have shown that this tenure reform has
enhanced the enthusiasm of farmers’ forestry investment by strengthening tenure security (Holden et al., 2013; Yi et al.,
2014). For instance, Shen et al. (2009) found that the uncertainty surrounding farmers’ forestland property rights has been
reduced after the CFTR. They analyzed data from nine villages located in three provinces in southeastern China. The results
indicated that about 90% of farmers believed they had forestland rights. Liu et al. (2017a) used 1778 household samples from
18 counties in nine provinces across six consecutive years, and found that the impact of the CFTR on households’ forestry
input and management were generally positive. After communicating with 520 forest farmers in Fujian province, Qin and Xu
(2013) pointed out that the frequent adjustment of forestland resulted in farmers having a very uncertain perception of
property rights arrangements, which hampered forestry inputs. It can be seen that forestland tenure security is still a key
issue and has yet to be resolved in China’s collective forest areas (Qin et al., 2011). Yin et al. (2013) found that, although the
reform improved the basic incentive structure, policy conflicts and inconsistencies are hindering future development.
Moreover, the reform’s transaction costs and policy constraints weaken the incentive effect of property rights decentral-
ization on farmers (Wen and Chen, 2015).
The above studies explored the impact of forestland tenure security on households’ forestry management behavior from
different perspectives. However, although strengthening forestry management and protection is key for improving forest
quality and promoting sustainable forestry development, the existing literature has seldom discussed the situation and strength
of farmers’management and protection of forestry. Furthermore, many scholars have focused on analyzing the impact of tenure
security on farmer behavior through only a single dimension, which is limited given that tenure security is a concept that
includes three dimensions or levels: legal, fact, and perception (Van Gelder, 2010; Ma et al., 2015). Hence tenure security at
different levels should have varied impacts on the behavior of farmers. At present, there are few studies that integrate forestland
tenure security across these dimensions into a unified framework to understand its role in farmers’ behavior. In response, this
paper uses household survey data from Zhejiang and Jiangxi provinces in the southern collective forest areas, as well as employs
the Negative Binomial and Tobit models, to analyze the relationship between tenure security and forestry management.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate forestland tenure security from the viewpoint of each level, and on this basis, to
explore the impact of forestland tenure security on households’ forestry management and protection. The rest of this paper is
organized as follows: Section 2 describes the CFTR and forestland tenure security in rural China; Section 3 presents the
econometric model specification; Section 4 shows the data source and descriptive statistics; Section 5 presents the estimation
results; Section 6 discusses the findings; and, Section 7 concludes with policy implications.
2. Forestland tenure security and forest management decisions
2.1. Forestland tenure reforms in China
For a clear understanding of forestland tenure security, it is important to describe the historical evolvement of forestland
tenure in China. The Land Reform Campaign that began in 1950 allocated forestland to households and formed a private
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system in rural China, a large number of forests have gradually transitioned to under cooperative management (Song et al.,
1997). Forest property rights were then transferred from advanced cooperatives to a higher level of advanced cooperative
called the People’s commune, further centralizing ownership (Dachang, 2001). However, the resulting agricultural failure and
famine caused forest ownership to be returned to production teams and households in 1961e1962 (Wang and Delang, 2011).
Afterwards, there was another reversal of policy on the ownership of forestland. Together, these studies suggest that the
current system (contracting systems and forest-to-household models) cannot guarantee the security of forestland tenure.
Since China’s reform and opening up in 1978 and the “Three Fixes” reformwas applied to collective forestland, nearly 70%
of such forestlandwas allocated to households (Wang et al., 2004; Xu and Jiang, 2009). Marginal forestlandwith few trees and
non-forested lands were allocated as family plots (Liu et al., 2017c). For these lands, households were entitled to permanent
use rights of the land and given ownership of the trees planted on the plots (Xie et al., 2014). With the Household Contract
Responsibility System, households were contracted by collectives with forestland, also known as responsibility hills
(Demurger et al., 2009). The benefits from these lands were shared by the collective and the households (Xu et al., 2013). But
the contract period for responsibility hills was only 5e15 years, too short to manage most timber species (Holden et al., 2013).
However, a massive illegal cutting of collective forests emerged after 1985 (Demurger and Yang, 2006). In response, the
central government decided to suspend the allocation and encouraged the development of the collective economy, so that
some of the allocated forests were converted back to collective management in 1987 (Siikam€aki et al., 2015; Dachang, 2001).
At the same time, the central authorities proposed to strictly implement the forest cutting quota system, timber unified
purchase and sale system, and forestry tax and fee system (Yin and Newman, 1997). This would, to some extent, control
households’ rights to both dispose of forest and benefit from it. From 1987 to 2003, the central problems faced by China’s
collective forest management system included the excessive taxation of forestry activity and confusion around property
rights due to their frequent changes (Liu et al., 2015). This led to higher forestland tenure insecurity, which decreased
households’ enthusiasm about investing in forestry (Delang and Wang, 2012).
The 2003 CFTR reformwas launched in the wake of the major changes in the internal and external conditions of collective
forestry development. The original aim of the CFTR was to change the state of forestland property rights and increase tenure
security; and since its beginning has provided effective legal documents for the protection of households’ forestland rights, as
well as issued a unified and national-level certificate for owned forestland (Yin et al., 2013). Moreover, the reform extends the
contract period for farmer households to 30, 50 or 70 years (Holden et al., 2013), and provides for its renewal after the contract
period expires. In recent years, the CFTR have focused on promoting the release of collective forestland management rights
and promoting various forms of moderate scale management. All such conditions inform households’ expectations regarding
forestland property rights and encourage forestland management.
2.2. Tenure security and forest management decisions
The connotation of forestland tenure security can be understood as the risk of losing forestland rights and benefits, or the
uncertainty of obtaining forestland rights and benefits (Jacoby et al., 2002). According to the modern theory of property right,
security tenure promotes the favorable behavior through such functions as incentive constraints, the internalization of ex-
ternalities, and optimization of resource allocations. Under a secure tenure system, households are less likely to lose
forestland, which can generate relatively stable returns (Deininger and Jin, 2004). Therefore, improving forestland tenure
security through the CFTR is an important policy measure that affects households’ forest management decisions, i.e. to en-
courages them to continue to manage forestland resources.
The rural household model is used to analyze household behavior in a theoretical framework (Cheng, 2014). According to
Sun (2008), the amount of household’s management and protection input depends on the profit that the input can bring, and
the profit of forestry production is equal to the difference between the expected income and production cost. Since the
expected income is affected by the amount of input and the forestland tenure security factor, the expected income can be
expressed as: R ¼ RðI; TÞ, where I is the amount of household’s management and protection input, and T is the expected
forestland tenure security factor. However, the production cost is affected by the amount of input, and the forestland tenure
security factor does not affect the production cost. Accordingly, the production cost can be expressed as: C ¼ CðIÞ. Therefore,
the profit of household’s forestry production is created as follows:
PðI; TÞ¼RðI; TÞ  CðIÞ (1)Since the expected income and production cost increase with the increase in input, vRvI >0;
vC
vI >0. The conditions for
households to optimally satisfy the maximization are:
vP
vI
¼ vR
vI
 vC
vI
(2)
v2PvI2
<0 (3)
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vP
vT
$
vP
vI
¼ vR
vT
$
vR
vI
(4)If the forestland tenure is insecure, households will face the risk of losing the expected income of their forestland.
Assuming that the probability of a household losing the expected income of forestland is lðTÞ, 0  lðTÞ  1, and vlvT < 0, the
safer the forestland tenure, the lower the probability that households will lose the expected income of the forestland. Then,
the expected income can be further expressed as:
RðI; TÞ¼ ½1 lðTÞ  VðIÞ (5)In Eq. (5), VðIÞ is the expected incomewhen forestland tenure is secure, and vVvI >0. That is, the greater the amount of input,
the greater the expected income when forestland tenure is secure.
From Eq. (5) can be derived: vRvT$
vR
vI ¼  vlvT$vVvI >0
So
vP
vT
$
vP
vI
>0
vI vP vP
,
v2P
Therefore; we can get
vT
¼  ð
vT
$
vI
Þ
vI2
>0 (6)Eq. (6) shows that the amount of household’s management input is positively correlated with the forestland tenure se-
curity. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed:
H1. Forestland tenure security will affect the forest management behavior of households, and secured tenure will stimulate the
enthusiasm of households for forest management and improve the forest management level
However, influenced by factors such as relevant laws, the economy, and customs in different regions, researchers have
different perspectives on land tenure security, including legal tenure security, actual tenure security and perceived tenure
security (Ma et al., 2015). Legal tenure security includes formal institutions such as land tenure laws, regulations, and national
policies (Van Gelder, 2010). The definition of the legal level is fundamental to safeguarding land tenure security. Actual tenure
security refers to the actual control of property rights by owners and reflects the results of formal institutions of property
rights at the grassroots level (Brasselle et al., 2002). Perceived tenure security is the subjective feeling of households regards
tenure security (Broegaard, 2005). It is considered to be the most direct reflection of tenure security. Because land tenure
needs to be shaped by the perception of tenure security by households, then it can play a role in influencing households’
decisions (Sjaastad and Bromley, 2000; Ma et al., 2016). Perception regarding tenure security is key to understanding
households’ behavioral decisions. While the laws, regulations, and policies of the CFTR in the collective forest area are the
same, and there are nevertheless great differences between the actual and perceived tenure security. Thus, this paper dis-
cusses the actual and perceived security of forestland tenure. As households’ perception of security regards forestland tenure
is formed through changes in the tenure system, actual tenure risks, and their personal experiences and preferences, each
household will have differing perceptions when facing the same actual tenure security status. This has led to deviations
between actual tenure security and perceived tenure security. In other words, actual tenure security may also be regarded by
households as insecure. However, there are interconnections between tenure security at different levels; moreover, the
implementation effect of the tenure systemwill have an impact on the subjective perception of households (Van Gelder, 2010)
and thus indirectly affect households’ behavior. Based on this, the following hypothesis is offered:
H2. Actual tenure security and perceived tenure security have different impacts on forest management, and the effect of perceived
tenure security on forest management is affected by the actual tenure security.3. Econometric model specification
3.1. Model specification
Due to the long production cycle of forests, in addition to the large amount of investment required during afforestation, it
is necessary to optimize the management of forests, covering weeding, fertilizing, fire-prevention, insect-prevention, and
guarding against thieves. Therefore, to examine the forestland management behavior of peasant households, this paper
analyzes the behavior in two aspects: management frequency and management intensity. The annual household’s man-
agement frequency, defined as the number of times a household go to their forestland for fire, insect, and theft prevention
every year, is used to characterize management frequency. Based on the findings of the field surveys, this measurement is an
important way for households to protect their forestlands. While the annual household labor input per unit area, which is
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estimating the impact of forestland tenure security on peasant household forest management is defined as:
Yi¼ b0 þ b1X1i þ b2X2i þ
X
b3jDji þ εi (7)Eq. (7) identifies two sets of models, in the first model, Yi denotes the forest management frequency of household i; X1i and
X2i are, respectively, the actual and perceived forestland tenure security of household i; Dji denotes other control variables
that affect household’s forest management frequency. Based on the existing literature as well as the characteristics of col-
lective forest tenure reform and household behavior, the following variables have been identified as relevant control vari-
ables: the household characteristics, forestland characteristics, village characteristics, policy regulation, and regional
characteristics. b0 is the constant term, while b1, b2 and b3j are the parameters to be estimated; and, εi is the error term. In the
second model, Yi denotes the forest management intensity of household i, and the remaining variables are same as those
included in the first model.
Furthermore, to explore the interaction effects of actual and perceived forestland tenure security, a cross term was
introduced to estimate another model, which is specified as follows:
Yi¼ b0 þ b1X1i þ b2X2i þ b3X1iX2i þ
X
b4jDji þ εi (8)In Eq. (8), b3 is the coefficient of the cross term. It reflects the indirect impact of actual tenure security on forest man-
agement through its effects on perceived tenure security. It needs to be pointed out that the addition of the cross term
recognizes the combined effects of actual and perceived forestland tenure security; nevertheless, it is difficult to identify
changes in the impact of perceived tenure security while changes are occurring in actual tenure security. Referring to the
practice of Li et al. (2017), this paper calculates the partial effect of perceived tenure security on the forest management of
households at different actual tenure security value points.
In the above model, since the forest management frequency of households conforms to the characteristics of the count
data, a count model was used to estimate the equation for management frequency. The general counting model includes the
Poisson and Negative Binomial models. However, the limitation of the Poisson model is that the expectation and variance of
the Poisson distribution must be equal, or “equidispersion,” which is often inconsistent with the actual data. For “over-
dispersion” data, the Negative Binomial model can be used for regression. The Negative Binomial model has more discrete
parameters than the Poisson model, which can explain the heterogeneity of the data.
The labor input per unit area to manage forestry and which represent management intensity, is a continuous variable. But
the data structure has a truncation on the left side at 0, resulting in a limited value of the dependent variable. A Tobit model
was thus used to estimate the equation for forest management intensity. In the data set, 37.6% of the samples were left-
censored for management intensity, while 62.4% of the samples were uncensored. The Tobit model is well suited to deal
with corner solutions.
3.2. Variable definition
The variables were divided into forest management, forestland tenure security, and control variables; the control variables
consist of household characteristics, village characteristics, forestland characteristics, policy regulation, and regional
characteristics.
Forest management: As mentioned above, forest management by households is defined as the rearing, management and
protection of forested land after afforestation. It can be measured by two different indicators, i.e. forest management fre-
quency and management intensity. Forest management frequency refers to the average number of times that households
protect their forestland against fire, insect prevention and theft per year. It measures households’ management of forestry in
terms of protection. Forest management intensity refers to the average annual laborers that households invest inweeding and
fertilizing their forestland, which measures the forest management inputs by rural households.
Forestland tenure security: Forestry tenure security is examined at both the actual and perceptual levels. Due to difficulties
in defining forest tenure and the implementation deviation of local policies, the fact that forestland certificates are not issued
often appears. It is clear that households’ ownership of forestland certificates (or not) reflects the efficacy of the forestland
property rights system. Possession of forestland certificates is thus used to measure actual tenure security. Possession of
forestland certificates takes the value 1 if a household did not possess a forestland certificate, 2 if a household possessed a
certificate for part of their forestland, and 3 if a household possessed a certificate for all of their forestland. In addition, based
on existing research and combined with the characteristics of collective forest tenure reform, perceived forest tenure security
is measured by the perception of households about forestland adjustments and forestland certificates. Perception about
forestland adjustments takes the value 1 if a household thinks that the forestland will be adjusted in the next 10 years, 2 if a
household is uncertain whether forestland adjustments will take place in the next 10 years, and 3 if a household does not
think that the forestland will be adjusted in the next 10 years. As the level of perception increases from 1 to 3, households are
more certain that their forestland will not be adjusted in future, and subsequently, the level of their perception regarding
forestland tenure security increases. Perception about forestland certificates takes the value 1 if a household thinks that a
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management may affect their perception of tenure security, which can lead to an endogeneity problem. To deal with this
problem, village-level perceptions about forestland adjustments and forestland certificates were used to represent perceived
tenure security according to the practice of Ma et al. (2016). It is defined as the average perception about two tenure security
of the sampled households from the same village. The reason is that the forest management decisions of one household do
not affect the forestland tenure security perceptions of others (Ma et al., 2016).
Household characteristics: Household characteristics consist of the age of the household head, the number of family la-
borers, and the value of a household’s fixed assets. In terms of the age of the household head, older household heads have
stronger feelings toward their land; thus they prefer to manage their forestland. Households with greater laborers are more
likely to manage their forestland. These two variables reflect differences in human capital. Households with more fixed assets
are less dependent on forestry, so resulting in less forestry management.
Village characteristics: Village characteristics include the village off-farm income ratio and the distance from the village to
the nearest town. The village off-farm income ratio refers to the average off-farm income ratio (off-farm income/total income)
of households in the village, which is used as a measure of the development of off-farm employment. A higher off-farm
income ratio in rural household reduces farmers’ dependence on forestland and weakens the incentives for farmers to
manage them. However, the direct introduction of the household off-farm income ratio will lead to endogenous problems;
therefore, this paper uses the village off-farm income ratio to reflect the impact of off-farm employment on households’ forest
management. Distance to the nearest town is an indicator of market access (Rao et al., 2016). Farmers living closer to town
have more off-farm employment opportunities. Meaning they may show less enthusiasm for managing forestry.
Forestland characteristics: These characteristics include forestland area, forestland quality, the average distance from
forestland to home, and type of forests (Timber forest or economic forest). Differences in resource endowment is one of the
factors that affects household behavior. Farmers are more likely to manage larger plots of forestland and better-quality land;
contrariwise, homes being far from forestland will inhibit households’ enthusiasm for forest management. There are also
differences in the management of different forest categories. The long growth cycle of timber forests makes farmers less
willing tomanage them, whereas households paymore attention to economically-driven forest management because it has a
short management period and faster investment returns.
Policy regulation: Policy regulation refers to the forest logging quota. Under the current logging system, obtaining the
logging quota is the only legal way for households to earn money from forestry. Therefore, the easiness to apply for forest
logging index is the main indicator for measuring the forest logging quota. The logging quotas make it impossible for farmers
to manage forestry in view of maximizing profits; this causes losses to farmers’ expected returns on forestry activity, and
directly discourages the management enthusiasm of farmers.
Regional characteristics: Three county dummies were introduced in this paper’s analysis to control the impact of unob-
served differences between regions on household forest management.
4. Data and descriptive statistics
4.1. The study area
This study uses data from household surveys conducted in Zhejiang and Jiangxi provinces in August and September 2017.
Zhejiang and Jiangxi provinces are the typical forestry regions in southern China, where forest coverage in 2018 was esti-
mated at 59.4% and 61.2%, respectively (NBSC, 2018). The two provinces, given their ranking for forest cover, have been
selected as pilot regions for the CFTR. They have significant differences in their level of economic development, forestry
development and progress in forest tenure reform. After consideration of factors such as forest resources and forest tenure
reform, four forest-dependent counties were selected as research areas, namely, Anji and Suichang in Zhejiang province, and
Chongyi and Suichuan in Jiangxi province, as shown in Fig. 1. They are key priority forest counties and advanced counties that
have taken the lead in promoting the CFTR in China. Hence, they are representative, to a degree.
Zhejiang has a relatively well-developed economy. With the new reform document issued in 2006, Zhejiang has achieved
remarkable results. 8% of China’s forestry output was produced in Zhejiang, with on 2% of the country’s forestland (Zhang,
2016). It provided valuable experience for national forestry reform and development. Anji county, with an area of
1886 km2, is located in the mountainous area in north-western Zhejiang province. In 2018, its GDP reached 5780 million USD
(ACBSC, 2018). With 70.2% forest cover and forestland of 135,313 hm2 (71.7% of the county’s total land area), forestry plays an
important role in the economic structure of the county (ACBSC, 2018). It is known in China as “bamboo county” (Xu et al.,
2013). Since the reform was officially initiated in Zhejiang, Anji county has shown great vitality and was awarded the title
of “model county of CFTR in Zhejiang province”. Suichang county is located in south-western Zhejiang, and its GDP totaled
1666 million USD in 2018 (SCBSC, 2018a). It owns 221,300 ha of forestland, accounting for 87.1% of the total land area (SCBSC,
2018b). It is thus a traditional forestry county. In 2006, Suichang was listed as the pilot county for forest tenure reform; 90% of
the county’s collective forestland have been granted rights to farmers; and the rate of issuing forest rights certificates has
reached 97% (Hua, 2010).
Jiangxi has more abundant forest resources, but is less developed economically. It started the new reform in 2004, which
aimed to optimize forestry production, liberate forestry productivity and mobilize the enthusiasm of farmers to manage
forestry. Chongyi county is located in the southwest of Jiangxi province and had a GDP of 1314 million USD in 2018 (CCBSC,
Fig. 1. Geographical distribution of sample areas in rural China.
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Chongyi was designated by the provincial government as a pilot county for the CFTR. Suichuan is another county in south-
western Jiangxi, with a GDP of 1852 million USD as of 2018 (SCPGC, 2018). It contains 246,000 ha of forestland, account-
ing for 78.2% of the total land area (JCPGC, 2018). Suichuan is also one of the pilot counties for forest tenure reform in Jiangxi. A
total of 77,856 forest rights certificates were issued to farmers during the reform period (Xie et al., 2009).
4.2. Data collection
As for the configuration of the sample (see Table 1), the random sampling method was adapted. Based on the forestry
production in each county, three towns were randomly chosen from each county, and 4 villages were selected randomly from
each town. Then 15e20 farmers in every village were chosen as the final respondents according to the size of the village. To
ensure the study’s quality, the final questionnaire was designed and revised through several discussions and the feedback
results of pre-tests. Moreover, a face-to-face interview method was used to collect the information from farmers. In this
survey, 793 questionnaires were issued and 766 valid samples were collected after deleting the questionnaires containing
missing values. Our questionnaire included sections on basic household information, the characteristics of forest resources,
forest management and production, and the status of forestland tenure. The regional distribution of the valid samples is
presented in Table 1.
4.3. Data description
Descriptive statistics of the data are shown in Table 2. Among the 766 households, there are 566 (73.9%) households with
positive concern for forestry; moreover, the number of households with labor inputs regards forest management is 478
(62.4%). On average, the management frequency of forestry across households is 13.43 times, while the labor input per unit
area is only 7.65 day/ha. This shows that rural households are not managing forestry very well, and the way they manage is
still relatively inefficient, which does little to mobilize the enthusiasm of households for forest management.
In this study’s sample, most of the rural households possess a forestland certificate, and the average value of village
perceptions about forestland adjustments equals 2.32, which shows that a large number of households are uncertainwhether
their forestland would be adjusted. 72% of the households feel that forestland certificates can protect forestland rights,
indicating that certificates are still important to households. The average age of the household head is 58 years old; the
number of family laborers is 2.47; and the value of fixed household assets equals 389,000 yuan on average. The average
proportion of off-farm income in the sample villages is 72%; and the distance to the nearest town is 5 km. Each household has
Table 1
Regional distribution of valid samples.
Province Zhejiang Jiangxi
County Anji Suichang Chongyi Suichuan
Number of samples 201 185 194 186
Share of samples (%) 26 24 26 24
Y. Yang et al. / Global Ecology and Conservation 22 (2020) e0095281.97 ha of forestland on average; 22% of the forestland has good soil quality; and the distance from the forestland to the
households was 3 km on average. 29% of the households primarily manage timber forest, and 20% of the households manage
economic forest. Additionally, the average value of the forest logging quota variable is 2.14, implying that the application for
forest logging index in recent years has been less difficult than before. However, most households still regard the application
for logging index as uneasy task.
Table 3 presents the forest management of households under different states of forestland tenure security. This study
found that as much as 88% of the households stated they have certificates for all their forestland, while only 4% of the
households said they possess certificates for only part of their forestland, and 8% of the households said they do not have any
certificates. The management frequency and intensity of the households with certificates for part of their forestland are both
higher than that of households without certificates, as well as thosewith certificates for all their forestland. The frequency and
intensity of households without certificates were the least. With respect to the perceived tenure security, nearly 43% of the
households do not think that the forestland will be adjusted in the next 10 years, whereas only 11% of households think that
there will be forestland adjustment. As households become more certain that their forestland will not be adjusted, the
management frequency of households gradually increased. In contrast, about 72% of the households believe that forestland
certificates protect forestland rights, while 28% of the households hold the opposite belief. Furthermore, the study found that
households who believe that certificates can protect forestland rights have higher management frequency and intensity.5. Estimation results
In this paper, Stata14.0 statistical software was used to explore the impact of forestland tenure security on forest man-
agement frequency and the management intensity of households. On the analysis of forest management frequency, it is
necessary to discriminate whether there is “overdispersion” in the data. The results show that the mean value is significantly
smaller than the variance, and the alpha test has a P value of 0.000 (<0.05), which passed the significance test. It indicates that
the data has “overdispersion,” and follows the Negative Binomial distribution. This paper therefore used the Negative
binomial model for estimation. The Tobit model was used to analyze the forest management intensity of households.Table 2
Variable meaning and descriptive statistics.
Variable Definition Mean Std.
Forest management Management frequency Management frequency of forestry (times) 13.43 44.63
Management intensity Labor input per unit area to manage forestry (day/ha) 7.65 10.95
Actual tenure
security
Possession of certificates 3 ¼ with certificates for all forestland, 2 ¼ with certificates for part of forestland,
1 ¼ without certificates
2.80 0.57
Perceived tenure
security
Village perception about
adjustments
Average perception about forestland adjustments of the sampled households from
the same village
2.32 0.21
Village perception about
certificates
Average perception about forestland certificates of the sampled households from
the same village
0.72 0.17
Household
characteristics
Age Age of household head (year) 57.81 10.64
Laborers Number of family laborers 2.47 1.18
Fixed asset Value of fixed assets (thousand yuan) 389.23 381.95
Village
characteristics
Village off-farm income ratio Average forestry income ratio (off-farm income/total income) of the households in
village
0.72 0.17
Distance to town Distance from village to the nearest town (km) 4.96 3.66
Forestland
characteristics
Forestland area Forestland area in the household (ha) 1.97 3.49
Forestland quality Good quality forestland area/total forestland area 0.22 0.40
Distance to home Average distance from forestland to home (km) 2.93 2.07
Timber forest 1 ¼ timber forest area account for the most, 0 ¼ otherwise 0.29 0.45
Economic forest 1 ¼ economic forest area account for the most, 0 ¼ otherwise 0.20 0.40
Policy regulation Forest logging quota 3 ¼ easy to apply for logging index, 2 ¼ not too easy to apply for, 1 ¼ difficult to
apply for
2.14 0.76
Regional
characteristics
Anji 1 ¼ Anji county, 0 ¼ otherwise 0.26 0.44
Suichang 1 ¼ Suichang county, 0 ¼ otherwise 0.24 0.43
Chongyi 1 ¼ Chongyi county, 0 ¼ otherwise 0.25 0.44
Table 3
Forest management under different states of forestland tenure security.
Forestland tenure security Share of
households(%)
Management
frequency
Management
intensity
Actual tenure security Possession of certificates Without certificates 8 5.87 0.42
With certificates for part of
forestland
4 17.79 0.98
With certificates for all forestland 88 13.96 0.50
Perceived tenure
security
Perception about
adjustments
Forestland will be adjusted 11 11.00 0.57
Uncertain 46 11.31 0.43
Forestland will not be adjusted 43 16.33 0.57
Perception about
certificates
Certificate cannot protect forestland
rights
28 8.97 0.50
Certificate can protect forestland
rights
72 15.18 0.51
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Table 4 reports the regression results for the forest management of households. This study found that the possession of
certificates had no significant impact on forest management frequency and intensity. This indicates that actual tenure se-
curity, i.e. holding a forestland certificate, does not incentivize households’management behavior. In other words, households
who have official certificates for all their forestland have not significantly increased their management frequency and in-
tensity in forestry. The reason is that the issuance rate of forestland certificates in the study area has gradually increased in
recent years. Among the 766 interviewed households, only 63 households do not have forestland certificates and 28
households have forestland certificates for only part of their forestland. Therefore, even if forestland certificates can ensure
that the expected income from forestland is not threatened by others or interfered with by external factors (Liu, 2011), its
impact on the forest management of households is not significant. Moreover, the weak nature of forestry makes it difficult for
rural households to obtain forestry income in the short term. In the presence of external selection, households with forestland
certificates may be more inclined to put labor into other off-farm industries to obtain more income, thereby weakening the
incentive effect of actual tenure security on forest management frequency and intensity in households.
From Table 4, it can be seen that the village perception about adjustments has a positive and statistically significant impact
on forest management frequency and management intensity. It shows that households who perceive no forestland adjust-
ments display a higher likelihood of managing forestry. Which is to say, perception about forestland adjustments is anTable 4
Regression results for forest management.
Independent variable Management frequency
(Negative binomial)
Management intensity
(Tobit)
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Forestland tenure security Possession of certificates 0.192 0.132 0.025 0.071
Village perception about adjustments 0.663* 0.340 1.007*** 0.205
Village perception about certificates 0.884 0.560 0.189 0.316
Household characteristics Age 0.013* 0.007 0.004 0.004
Laborers 0.153*** 0.058 0.022 0.034
Ln (fixed asset) 0.174** 0.067 0.064 0.041
Village characteristics Village off-farm income ratio 0.114 0.384 0.270 0.236
Distance to town 0.070*** 0.019 0.020* 0.011
Forestland characteristics Forestland area 0.007*** 0.002 0.001* 0.001
Forestland quality 0.829*** 0.166 0.150 0.099
Distance to home 0.106*** 0.033 0.031 0.019
Timber forest 0.172 0.183 0.012 0.106
Economic forest 0.073 0.224 0.289** 0.125
Policy regulation Forest logging quota 0.325*** 0.087 0.023 0.051
Regional characteristics Anji 0.759*** 0.264 0.298* 0.155
Suichang 0.032 0.208 0.042 0.124
Chongyi 0.163 0.203 0.440*** 0.117
Constant 0.832 1.454 1.638* 0.856
Number of obs 766 766
LR chi2 160.74 89.14
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000
Log likelihood 2332.548 879.827
Notes: *, **, and ***denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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making, households will first distinguish and review relevant information, which will then guide their decision-making (Niu
and Zhou, 2014). Therefore, when households understand forestland tenure, they feel that the risk of future adjustments to
their forestland is lower and the expected income from such lands is more certain. Thus, they worry less about managing
forestland. This strengthens the incentives for households to manage and protect forestland (Yi et al., 2014), which not only
increases households’ management frequency but also improves the management intensity of households. However, the
village perception about certificates has no significant impact on forest management frequency and management intensity.
This may be explained by the changes to the collective forestland tenure system in China. Frequent changes have led to
households’ lack of security in terms of property rights for collective forests (Holden et al., 2013). When a village decides to
retract a land certificate, no matter how strong the household thinks it has a right to protect the land, it will lose the land (Qin
and Xu, 2013). It can be seen that the attributes of forest resources cause the government to have strong control over forest
resources. Thus, the protection of forestland rights by forestland certificates is at present primarily to draw a clear line and
prevent other households from infringing. That said, it has not played a role in protecting against forestland adjustments and
expropriations by the government. Thus, the perception about forestland certificates as a means of protecting forestland
rights has no obvious incentive effect on the forest management of households. Overall, perceived tenure security is more
encouraging for households’ forest management than actual tenure security. When forestland tenure is transformed into
households’ subjective perception of forestland tenure, the forest management behavior of households can be better un-
derstood. The primary purpose of the CFTR is to encourage households to manage forestry through increasing the security of
forestland tenure. But deviations in policy implementation and a lag in forestry market conditions has affected households’
perception of forestland tenure security, leading to low enthusiasm for households regards forest management. In addition,
compared to the existing literature (e.g. Yang et al., 2018), our results, on the one hand, confirm that the possession of cer-
tificates is not a strong incentive to improve the level of forest management. On the other hand, we found that the village
perception about adjustments can significantly increase the frequency and intensity of forest management, but the village
perception about certificates does not.
With respect to household characteristics, the age of the household head has a significant positive effect on forest
management frequency, showing that elderly household heads tend to look after their forestland. Laborers also has a sig-
nificant positive impact on management frequency, indicating that households with more laborers have higher forest
management frequency. The fixed assets of households are negatively correlated with management frequency. Which is to
say, households which have more fixed assets are less dependent on forestry. Regarding village characteristics, the distance
from a village to the nearest town positively affects management frequency and management intensity, as expected. Such
means that the farther the rural household is from town, the higher the management frequency and the greater the labor
input. This is because households that are living far away from towns are not easily exposed to new things, and therefore tend
to depend on the forests.
Regards forestland characteristics, forestland area positively affects management frequency, while having a significant
negative impact on management intensity. A possible reason is that to achieve scale management, households are more
inclined to protect large areas of forestland, which lead to a reduction in labor cost and help to increase forest management
frequency. Forestland quality also has a positive impact on management frequency, indicating that the higher the proportion
of good quality forestland, the higher the management frequency of households. The distance from forestland to homes is
negatively correlated with management frequency. Such shows that households are reluctant to protect forestland that is far
away; inversely, nearby forestland are more likely to be managed and protected, and allow households to engage in off-farm
production. Economic forest positively affects management intensity, meaning that households prefer to manage economic
forest, given its short growth cycle. Additionally, forest logging quotas have a significant positive impact on management
frequency. When the logging index is easy to apply to, households increase management frequency. Finally, regional dummy
variables have different degrees of influence on forest management frequency and management intensity.
5.2. Interaction effect of actual and perceived tenure security on forest management
Table 5 reports the regression results after introducing the cross-term of actual and perceived tenure security. The results
show that the significance and direction of the variables are consistent with Table 4. The interaction term between the
possession of certificates and village perception about adjustments has an insignificant effect on management frequency,
while it has a significant positive impact on management intensity. Regards the village perception about certificates, the
interaction term is found to have a significant negative effect on management frequency, but not on management intensity.
This indicates that actual and perceived tenure security do not show a consistent interaction effect on households’ forest
management.
This study further calculated the average marginal effects of perceived tenure security on forest management under
different states of actual tenure security, as shown in Table 6.With the possession of certificates, ranging from no certificate to
having certificates for all forestland, the marginal effects of the village perception about forestland adjustments on the two
management variables are all on the rise. In other words, improvements in the possession of certificates reinforce the positive
effect of village perception about forestland adjustments on forest management. Specifically, the village perception about
adjustments tends to have a significant positive impact onmanagement frequency andmanagement intensity for households
who possessed certificates for all their forestland, but not for those who did not possess certificates or possessed certificates
Table 5
Regression results for introducing cross-term.
Independent variable Management
frequency (Negative
binomial)
Management
intensity (Tobit)
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Forestland tenure security Possession of certificates 0.070 0.151 0.023 0.077
Village perception about adjustments 0.634* 0.351 0.930*** 0.208
Village perception about certificates 0.771 0.571 0.183 0.316
Possession of certificates  Village perception about adjustments 0.024 0.097 0.095** 0.047
Possession of certificates  Village perception about certificates 0.171** 0.076 0.014 0.035
Household characteristics Age 0.013* 0.007 0.004 0.004
Laborers 0.149** 0.057 0.021 0.034
Ln (fixed assets) 0.182*** 0.068 0.059 0.040
Village characteristics Village off-farm income ratio 0.060 0.386 0.274 0.236
Distance to town 0.065*** 0.019 0.021* 0.011
Forestland characteristics Forestland area 0.006*** 0.002 0.001* 0.001
Forestland quality 0.816*** 0.165 0.152 0.099
Distance to home 0.098*** 0.033 0.030 0.019
Timber forest 0.183 0.182 0.012 0.106
Economic forest 0.077 0.226 0.273** 0.125
Policy regulation Forest logging quota 0.340*** 0.087 0.025 0.051
Regional characteristics Anji 0.723*** 0.263 0.275* 0.155
Suichang 0.055 0.212 0.030 0.125
Chongyi 0.173 0.203 0.436*** 0.116
Constant 0.175 1.487 1.467* 0.867
Observations 766 766
LR chi2 166.38 93.19
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000
Log likelihood 2329.730 877.803
Notes: *, **, and ***denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 6
Average marginal effects for perceived tenure security.
Variable Management
frequency
(Negative
binomial)
Management
intensity (Tobit)
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Village perception about adjustments Possession of certificates ¼ 1 (without certificates) 3.702 22.143 0.213 0.325
Possession of certificates ¼ 2 (with certificates for part of forestland) 6.507 11.456 0.121 0.172
Possession of certificates ¼ 3 (with certificates for all forestland) 10.183* 5.476 0.465*** 0.090
Village perception about certificates Possession of certificates ¼ 1 (without certificates) 56.041 36.948 0.189 0.301
Possession of certificates ¼ 2 (with certificates for part of forestland) 30.678** 14.599 0.128 0.174
Possession of certificates ¼ 3 (with certificates for all forestland) 6.129 8.966 0.065 0.141
Notes: *, **, and ***denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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forestland and believe that the forestland will not be adjusted in the future that they will be more certain about the future
expected income from forestry. This means that management frequency and management intensity will be strengthened at
the same time. Contrarily, there is a downward trend in the marginal effect of the village perception about forestland cer-
tificates on the management variables, with the possession of certificates ranging from no certificate to having certificates for
all forestland. In terms of significance, households which possessed certificates for only part of their forestland, the perception
about certificates’ ability to protect forestland rights positively affected management frequency. A possible reason is that
these households are more likely to expect to possess certificates for all their forestland to protect their land rights, which
motivates them to increase their management frequency; nevertheless, households who already have certificates for all their
forestland are less likely to strengthen management because the protection from certificates is limited.
Furthermore, for the interaction effect of actual tenure security and perceived tenure security on forest management, our
results go further beyond those of Yang et al. (2018), which focused on the interaction effect of possession of certificates and
perception of household on adjustments. More specifically, our study introduced the interaction term of possession of cer-
tificates and village perception about adjustments, and the interaction term of possession of certificates and village
perception about certificates, respectively. Based on this, our study calculated also the average marginal effects of village
Y. Yang et al. / Global Ecology and Conservation 22 (2020) e0095212perception about adjustments and village perception about certificates on forest management under different states of
possession of certificates.6. Discussion
Our results confirm several findings of the related literature, but also provide results that contrast the findings of some of
the existing studies. For instance, some existing studies have found that the CFTR have increased households’ investment
incentives through the issuance of forestland certificates (e.g. Yi et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2017a). However, the findings from the
present study indicate that the actual tenure security in the current forestland tenure institutional framework, derived from
the possession of forestland certificates, is not a key factor in improving the level of household forestry management.
Especially, the most significant extension of this study upon previous studies is the analysis of the impact of forestland tenure
security on forest management from the actual level and the perceptual level. In addition, compared to Yang et al. (2018), we
further measured the perceived tenure security using the village perception about forestland adjustments and the village
perception about forestland certificates. Based on this, we find that the village perception about adjustments significantly
increase the frequency and intensity of forest management, but the village perception about certificates does not. This in-
dicates that when actual tenure security is aligned with the perception of households, forestland tenure security will
stimulate forest management. That said, the two perceived tenure security variables have markedly different effects on forest
management. A possible reason is that no adjustments means that there will be no changes to forestland in the coming years,
including the government not expropriating forestland. Households will feel that forestland tenure is thus more stable. The
forestland certificate is meant to protect against occupation by other households and business enterprises, but it does not
prevent the government from expropriating.
Another critical aspect is that there are differences in the influence of perceived tenure security on forest management
under different levels of actual tenure security. The results indicate that increases in the possession of certificates strengthens
the incentive effect of the perception about forestland adjustments to forest management; moreover, the perception that the
forestland will not be adjusted significantly and positively affects management frequency and management intensity for
households with certificates for all their forestland. This means that possessing certificates for all forestland and determining
that the forestland will not be adjusted are indispensable for improving forest management. In contrast, increases in the
possession of certificates weakens the impact of the perception about forestland certificates on forest management, indi-
cating that the possession of certificates and the perception about certificates have a substitution effect on the impact of forest
management. Additionally, the role of land certificates in protecting forestland rights has a significant positive impact on
management frequency for households with certificates for only part of their forestland. This is because those households
believe that holding certificates for all their forestland will better protect their land rights, therebymaking themmorewilling
to take care of their forests.
The results of this study indicate that the perceived tenure security of forestland has a greater impact on household forest
management, while actual tenure security affects management indirectly by influencing perceived tenure security. It can be
seen that raising awareness about the security of forestland tenure for rural households is the focus of the CFTR, especially
regards improving the perception about no forestland adjustments. However, the ever-changing experience of forestland
tenure in China has resulted in negative impacts on the perceived tenure security of households. Lag in the supportive reform
of CFTR has also weakened the perception of forestland tenure security among households. All of which make it difficult to
stimulate the enthusiasm of households toward forest management.7. Conclusion and implications
Themanagement and protection of forested land by rural households plays an important role in enhancing productivity as
well as increasing the volume of collective forests. However, existing studies on the impact of collective forestland tenure on
households’ forestry production have primarily focused on afforestation, timber harvesting, and overall forest investment.
Only a few studies have analyzed the effect of forestland tenure security on forest management decisions. This paper used
data collected from 766 households in Zhejiang and Jiangxi province to empirically analyze forestland tenure security and
forest management. Generally speaking, forestland tenure security has an impact on household forest management, but the
degrees of influence between actual and perceived levels of tenure security is inconsistent.
The empirical results reveal that the actual tenure security, derived from the possession of certificates, has not significantly
increased forest management frequency or management intensity. In relation to the perceived tenure security, the perception
about adjustments could improve both management frequency and management intensity, whereas the perception about
certificates does not. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the effect of perceived tenure security on forest
management is affected by the actual tenure security, which is obvious from the significant coefficients of the cross-terms
between actual tenure security and perceived tenure security, as well as the significant coefficients of the average mar-
ginal effects of perceived tenure security on forest management under different states of actual tenure security. For house-
holds with certificates for all forestland, the results indicate that the perception about adjustments has a positive impact on
both management frequency and intensity. For households with certificates for part of forestland, the perception about
certificates positively affects management frequency.
Y. Yang et al. / Global Ecology and Conservation 22 (2020) e00952 13Three important policy implications can be derived from this research. First, actual tenure security helps to strengthen
households’ perception of tenure security. Such can increase actual tenure security by deepening the CFTR’s main reform,
which involves improving the work of granting certifications in reforms and ensuring the full issuance of forestland certif-
icates to enhance the value of possessing forestland certificates. The problem of forest rights disputes, left over from the
historical reforms of collective forestland tenure, is recommended to be solved simultaneously. Second, perceived tenure
security can be an effective tool for improving forest management. Hence policies should pay more attention to household
perceptions of forestland tenure security. The local government should implement policy provisions to improve awareness
about forest tenure reform, so as to avoid distortions during implementation. It is also necessary to strengthen advocacy to
expand households’ policy awareness, such that their effects can influence the subjective perceptions of households in a
timely manner. In addition, since the perception of forestland certificates does not play a positive role in improving forest
management, the local government should restrain from freely recovering existing certificates, so as to ensure that the
forestland certificate currently in effect still effectively protect the rights of their holders. Finally, the CFTR’s supportive reform
also needs to improve to give households as many rights as possible, as well as reduce households’ concerns regarding forest
management. At the same time, appropriate technical and financial support should be provided to better activate their
willingness to manage.
A limitation in this research is the use of cross-sectional data for analysis. The long growth cycle of forests requires panel
data to analyze its management. The findings of this study are based on regional data covering only four counties in southern
China. Thus, the conclusions may not apply to other places. For a broader understanding, a larger sample size and long-term
panel data should be used in future research, so as to better examine the relationship between forestland tenure security and
household forest management.
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